

## Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 05132 01 OF 02 251951Z

67

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15

ACDA-19 IO-14 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 DRC-01 MC-02 /166 W  
----- 078008

R 251730Z OCT 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2340

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USNMR SHAPE

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5132

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR WORKING GROUP: DRAFT REPORT ON SHAPE ASSESSMENT OF  
OPTION III

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: USNATO 4839; B) STATE 204554

MBFR WORKING GROUP STAFF HAS NOW CIRCULATED REVISED DRAFT  
REPORT ON SHAPE ASSESSMENT OF OPTION III (WHICH APPERAS AS  
AC/276-WP(73)36 (REVISED). MISSION FINDS NEW TEXT CONSIDERABLE  
IMPROVEMENT OVER DRAFT REPORTED REF A AND RECOMMENDS THAT,  
UNLESS WASHINGTON SEE OBJECTIONS, WE BE AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT  
IT AS TECHNICAL STUDY, PER EARLIER GUIDANCE REF B.

BEGIN TEXT

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 05132 01 OF 02 251951Z

SHAPE ASSESSMENT OF OPTION III IN "THE UNITED STATES  
APPROACH TO MBFR"

REVISED DRAFT WORKING GROUP REPORT

THE WORKING GROUP HAVE EXAMINED THE SHAPE ASSESSEMENT(1) OF THE THIRD REDUCTION CONCEPT(2), COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS THE MIXED PACKAGE REDUCTION CONCEPT, WHICH INVOLVES A 20 PERCENT REDUCTION IN THOSE FORCES WHICH EACH SIDE MAY PERCEIVE AS THREATENING (OFFENSIVE FORCES). IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THE THIRD REDUCTION CONCEPT IS NOT AN ACTIVE REDUCTION PROPOSAL; RATHER IT IS A HYPOTHETICAL REDUCTION OPTION, AN ILLUSTRATION OF A POSSIBLE MIXED PACKAGE ELEMENT IN MBFR. THE WORKING GROUP NOTE THAT THIS REDUCTION CONCEPT INVOLVES SOME BROADER ISSUES WITH SERIOUS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS BEYOND THE SCOPE AND COMPETENCE OF THE WORKING GROUP TO ADDRESS. THESE INCLUDE, INTER ALIA, JUDGMENTS ON THE EFFECT OF THE OPTION ON NATO'S DETERRENCE; THE COURSE OF FUTURE DECISIONS ON THE LANCE ACQUISITION PROGRAMME; THE ADVISABILITY OF ACTIVELY NEGOTIATING SOME SUCH OPTION AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS OF THE MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE CAPABILITY WHICH ARE NORMALLY STATIONED WITHIN SOVIET TERRITORY. WITHIN THE SPECIFIC CONTENTS OF OPTION III, HOWEVER, THE WORKING GROUP HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE SHAPE ASSESSMENT.

2. THE SHAPE ASSESSMENT IS WELCOMED AS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO EXAMINATION OF THIS SENSITIVE MATTER. SINCERE APPRECIATION IS EXTENDED FOR THIS LUCID ASSESSMENT, FRAMED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PERMIT ITS REVIEW HERE AT NATO HEADQUARTERS WITHOUT THE NECESSITY OF DELVING INTO THE MORE DETAILED AND RESTRICTED UNDERLYING INFORMATION.

3. THE SHAPE ASSESSMENT IN SEVERAL PLACES (PARAGRAPHS 3, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21 AND 30) EMPHASISES THE IMPLICATIONS OF OPTION III IN GENERATING DE FACTO CEILINGS ON VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF NATO FORCES. THE WORKING GROUP VIEW THESE AS VALID CONCERNS. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT OPTION III IS AIMED AT THE REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY, NOT SPECIFICALLY AT REDUCTIONS OR LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. NONETHELESS, THE WORKING GROUP VIEW WITH CONCERN THE IMPLICATIONS OF OPTION III FOR PRODUCING POSSIBLE ONE-SIDED DE FACTO CEILINGS ON NATO'S TACTICAL  
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 05132 01 OF 02 251951Z

NUCLEAR SYSTEM. THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT DE FACTO CEILINGS ON THE US ELEMENTS CONCERNED IN OPTION III MIGHT EXTEND TO ENCOMPASS EQUIVALENT ELEMENTS OF OTHER NATO ALLIES IN THE NGA. THERE ARE OTHER FACTORS WHICH BEAR ON THIS PROBLEM, VIZ:

(A) SINCE THE SCUD AND FROG TACTICAL NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS ARE ORGANIC ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET TANK ARMY TO BE WITHDRAWN, A LOGICAL BASIS MAY EXIST, IN PRINCIPLE THOUGH NOT IN SCALE, FOR A RECIPROCAL DE FACTO CEILING ON SOVIET TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN THE NGA, AT LEAST IN RESPECT OF THESE SPECIFIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

(B) ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO FIRM EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS

KEEP ANY WARHEADS IN THE NGA, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ARGUE THAT THEY MUST HAVE AND THAT WHEN THE 9 SCUD AND 20 FROG ARE WITHDRAWN WITH THEIR PARENT TANK ARMY A NUMBER OF WARHEADS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN WITH THEM. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT COULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR A DE FACTO LIMITATION ON WP NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN THE NGA.

(C) THERE IS A VERY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ADDRESSING OF NUCLEAR (OR DUAL-CAPABLE) DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN MBFR AND NUCLEAR WARHEADS. THE DELIVERY SYSTEMS COULD FALL WITHIN THE GENERAL APPROACH THAT MAJOR WEAPONS MAY BE ADDRESSED, COUNTED AND VERIFIED (SUBJECT TO RESTRICTION ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF ON-SITE INSPECTION). NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR WARHEADS, HOWEVER, CANNOT BE SO COUNTED AND VERIFIED EXCEPT BY A DEGREE OF INTRUSIVE INSPECTION WHICH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE.

(D) THE CONSEQUENCES OF A POSSIBLE ONE-SIDED DE FACTO CEILING ON NATO DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO OVERCOME AND COULD PRODUCE A CEILING NOT ONLY ON ALL US TACTICAL AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED IN THE NGA BUT ALSO ON NON-US NATO AIRCRAFT OF THE SAME TYPE.

(E) THE WG BELIEVE THAT CAREFUL CONSIDERATION WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE IMPLIED DE FACTO CEILING LIMITATIONS ON NATO'S FORCE IMPROVEMENT PLANS AND DEFENCE POSTURE.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 05132 02 OF 02 251952Z

67

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15

ACDA-19 IO-14 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 DRC-01 MC-02 /166 W  
----- 078042

R 251730Z OCT 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2341

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USNMR SHAPE

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 5132

4. QUITE APART FROM THE NUCLEAR ASPECTS, THIS OPTION WOULD EXTEND THE SCOPE OF MBFR FROM GROUND FORCES ALONE TO THE INCLUSION OF AIR FORCES AND COULD PROVIDE THE WP WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO PURSUE DEMANDS FOR REDUCTIONS IN OTHER TYPES OF AIRCRAFT. THE WORKING GROUP CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF DEFINING MORE PRECISELY THE IMPACT OF THE REDUCTION OF 54 US F-4 AIRCRAFT AND 35 PERSHING LAUNCHERS ON CURRENT PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS TO INCLUDE THE CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS OF THESE DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT REDUCTIONS. IT IS NOTED THAT THE US THIRD OPTION INCLUDES AS A BASIC ASSUMPTION THAT THE US AIRCRAFT WITHDRAWN WOULD BE RETURNED IN EMERGENCY IN A VERY SHORT TIME, AND CERTAINLY WITHIN ANY REASONABLE WARNING PERIOD PRIOR TO OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. IT IS ON THAT ASSUMPTION, I.E. THAT THE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO IMPLEMENT THE GDP, THAT SHAPE HAS ASSESSED THE IMPACT OF THIS OPTION. THE WORKING GROUP NOTE THAT THEIR ON-GOING STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF REDUCTIONS OF TACTICAL AIRCRAFT ON THE CONVENTIONAL BATTLE WILL BE RELEVANT TO THIS ISSUE, AND THAT THEY WILL BE IN A SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 05132 02 OF 02 251952Z

BETTER POSITION TO COMMENT ON THIS ASPECT WHEN THAT STUDY IS COMPLETED. THEY WERE ADVISED THAT THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE WITH GREATER PRECISION WHEN THE ACTUAL UNITS WERE IDENTIFIED.

5. THE WORKING GROUP SUPPORT THE SHAPE VIEWS (PARAGRAPHS 29-33) ON VERIFICATION AND CONSTRAINTS. CONCERNING THE UNACCEPTABILITY TO THE WEST OF INTRUSIVE INSPECTION, THE WORKING GROUP EMPHASIZE THAT ALL THEIR PREVIOUS STUDIES HAVE ASSUMED THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD PERMIT CLOSE ON-SITE INSPECTION OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OR WARHEADS. NEITHER SIDE WOULD PERMIT INTRUSIVE INSPECTION OF WARHEADS; NOR INTERNAL INSPECTION OF AIRCRAFT OR OTHER NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS. IT WOULD BE REASONABLE AND NECESSARY TO PERMIT A COUNT OF AIRCRAFT, AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS, TO CONFIRM REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, IT WOULD NOT BE TOLERABLE TO PERMIT SUCH A COUNT OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS, WHICH ARE IN A TOTALLY DIFFERENT CATEGORY FROM THE DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

6. IN THEIR REVIEW OF THIS SHAPE ASSESSMENT THE WORKING GROUP HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE DPC MINISTERIAL POLICY GUIDANCE(3) ON THE "CONCEPT FOR THE ROLE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCES IN ACE". IT APPEARS FROM THE SHAPE COMMENTARY THAT NATO'S POST-REDUCTION FORCES IN OPTION III WOULD RETAIN THE CAPABILITY, ALBEIT SOMEWHAT DEGRADED, TO CARRY OUT THE REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH BY THIS POLICY GUIDANCE.

## FOOTNOTES

(1) SHAPE 1000.1/20-5-4-73(CTS), 25TH AUGUST, 1973

(2) US PAPER OF 30TH APRIL, 1973 "THE US APPROACH TO MBFR"

(3) DPC/D(7059(REVISED), 21ST DECEMBER, 1973

END TEXT RUMSFELD

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 02 APR 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 25 OCT 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** boyleja  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973NATO05132  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** NATO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19731064/abqcecv.tel  
**Line Count:** 220  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** n/a  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** USNATO 4839; B) STATE 204554  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** boyleja  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 17 AUG 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <17-Aug-2001 by elyme>; APPROVED <26-Sep-2001 by boyleja>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR WORKING GROUP: DRAFT REPORT ON SHAPE ASSESSMENT OF OPTION III  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO  
**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO USNMR SHAPE  
USDOCOSOUTH  
USLOSACLANT  
USCINCEUR  
VIENNA  
**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005